The Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions

Antoine Pietri (), Tarik Tazdaït and Mehrdad Vahabi
Additional contact information
Antoine Pietri: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We build a theoretical framework consistent with historical evidence in which empire-building is explained by price and predatory competitions on the market for protection. We explore how the assets structure possessed by the buyers of protection influences the nature of protection and in fine the size of empires. Our main contribution is to introduce a distinction between two types of rent, namely an "absolute" and a "differential" one. The first corresponds to rents extracted by empires using threats and coercion; the second, to economic advantages conferred on subjects of an empire.

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2017, 13 (2), pp.253-278. ⟨10.1628/093245616X14659946859954⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions (2017)
Working Paper: The Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01425105

DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14659946859954

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().