The Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions

Antoine Pietri, Tarik Tazdaït and Mehrdad Vahabi

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2017, vol. 173, issue 2, 253-278

Abstract: We build a theoretical framework consistent with historical evidence in which empire-building is explained by price and predatory competitions on the market for protection. We explore how the assets structure possessed by the buyers of protection influences the nature of protection and in fine the size of empires. Our main contribution is to introduce a distinction between two types of rent, namely an "absolute" and a "differential" one. The first corresponds to rents extracted by empires using threats and coercion; the second, to economic advantages conferred on subjects of an empire.

JEL-codes: D74 H56 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions (2017)
Working Paper: The Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions (2017)
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DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14659946859954

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