Commitment and anticipated utilitarianism

Xiangyu Qu

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Much empirical evidence demonstrates that individual preferences may not be consistent. This leads to an important question: how should societal preferences be formulated when individuals behave inconsistently? This paper, restricted to a class of preferences, addresses this question by (1) proposing a new method to rationalize individual preferences; (2) introducing a new version of Pareto principle with respect to the rationalized preferences; and (3) characterizing the societal preferences which respect this principle.

Keywords: commitment and temptation; aggregation of preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 47 (2), pp.349 - 358. ⟨10.1007/s00355-016-0965-0⟩

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Journal Article: Commitment and anticipated utilitarianism (2016)
Working Paper: Commitment and anticipated utilitarianism (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01437535

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0965-0

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