Commitment and anticipated utilitarianism

Xiangyu Qu

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 47, issue 2, No 6, 349-358

Abstract: Abstract Much empirical evidence demonstrates that individual preferences may not be consistent. This leads to an important question: how should societal preferences be formulated when individuals behave inconsistently? This paper, restricted to a class of preferences, addresses this question by (1) proposing a new method to rationalize individual preferences; (2) introducing a new version of Pareto principle with respect to the rationalized preferences; and (3) characterizing the societal preferences which respect this principle.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0965-0

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