 Purely subjective extended Bayesian models with Knightian unambiguityUniversité Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL Abstract: This paper provides a model of belief representation in which ambiguity and unambiguity are endogenously distinguished in a purely subjective setting where objects of choices are, as usual, maps from states to consequences. Specifically, I first extend the maxmin expected utility theory and get a representation of beliefs such that the probabilistic beliefs over each ambiguous event are represented by a non-degenerate interval, while the ones over each unambiguous event are represented by a number. I then consider a class of the biseparable preferences. Two representation results are achieved and can be used to identify the unambiguity in the context of the biseparable preferences. Finally a subjective definition of ambiguity is suggested. It provides a choice theoretic foundation for the Knightian distinction between ambiguity and unambiguity. Keywords: Knightian distinction; Maxmin expected utility; Biseparable preference; Unambiguous event (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Theory and Decision, 2015, 79 (4), pp.547-571. ⟨10.1007/s11238-015-9489-9⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01437537 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9489-9 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL |
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