Purely subjective extended Bayesian models with Knightian unambiguity

Xiangyu Qu

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper provides a model of belief representation in which ambiguity and unambiguity are endogenously distinguished in a purely subjective setting where objects of choices are, as usual, maps from states to consequences. Specifically, I first extend the maxmin expected utility theory and get a representation of beliefs such that the probabilistic beliefs over each ambiguous event are represented by a non-degenerate interval, while the ones over each unambiguous event are represented by a number. I then consider a class of the biseparable preferences. Two representation results are achieved and can be used to identify the unambiguity in the context of the biseparable preferences. Finally a subjective definition of ambiguity is suggested. It provides a choice theoretic foundation for the Knightian distinction between ambiguity and unambiguity.

Keywords: Knightian distinction; Maxmin expected utility; Biseparable preference; Unambiguous event (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Theory and Decision, 2015, 79 (4), pp.547-571. ⟨10.1007/s11238-015-9489-9⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Purely subjective extended Bayesian models with Knightian unambiguity (2015)
Working Paper: Purely subjective extended Bayesian models with Knightian unambiguity (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01437537

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9489-9

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().