Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization

Denis Claude () and Mabel Tidball ()
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Mabel Tidball: LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal environmental policy in a mixed market when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule, the accumulated stock of pollution, firms' production paths and profit streams are identical irrespective of the public firm's ownership status.

Keywords: mixed duopoly; privatization; irrelevance theorem; tax; differential game; mixed market; partial privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02655045v2
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2010, pp.2946-2954

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization (2010)
Working Paper: Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization (2006)
Working Paper: Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization (2006)
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