Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization

Denis Claude () and Mabel Tidball ()

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule, the accumulated stock of pollution, firms’ production paths and profit streams are identical irrespective of the public firm’s ownership status.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2006-07, Revised 2006-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization (2010)
Working Paper: Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization (2010)
Working Paper: Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:06-06

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