Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited

Bruno Amable, Donatella Gatti and Jan Schumacher

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper aims to shed light on the role of the 'ideology'of political parties in shaping the evolution of the welfare state in 18 developed democracies, by providing empirical ...ndings on the determinants of social programs entitlements and social spending over the period 1981-1999. The paper shows that structural change is a major determinant of the extent of social protection. Our results suggest that overall spending is driven up by structural change. On the other hand, strong structural change has a negative influence on welfare entitlements measured by the net rate of sickness insurance. Partisan influence plays an important role in the dynamics of the welfare state. Left-wing governments strengthen the positive effect of shocks on aggregate social expenditure while right-wing governments undertake even stronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a reaction to structural change.

Keywords: Welfare State; ideology; structural change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2006, 22 (3), pp.426-444. ⟨10.1093/oxrep/grj025⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited (2006)
Working Paper: Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited (2006)
Working Paper: Welfare state retrenchment: The partisan effect revisited (2006)
Working Paper: Welfare state retrenchment: The partisan effect revisited (2006)
Working Paper: Welfare State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00176295

DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/grj025

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