Consensus, communication and knowledge: an extension with bayesian agents
Lucie Ménager ()
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Lucie Ménager: EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Parikh and Krasucki  showed that pairwise communication of the value of a function f leads to a consensus about the communicated value if the function f is convex. They showed that union consistency of f may not be sufficient to guarantee consensus in any communication protocol. Krasucki  proved that consensus occurs for any union consistent function if the protocol contains no cycle. We show that if agents communicate their optimal action, namely the action that maximizes their expected utility, then consensus obtains in any fair protocol for any action space.
Keywords: pairwise communication; common knowledge; consensus; communication de bouche à oreille; connaissance commune (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in 2005
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Working Paper: Consensus, Communication and Knowledge: an Extension with Bayesian Agents (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00194381
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