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Consensus, Communication and Knowledge: an Extension with Bayesian Agents

Lucie Ménager

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We extend the result of Parikh and Krasucki [1990] to the case where the set of available decisions is arbitrary. We show that if agents are bayesian and choose the action that maximizes their expected utility, then word of mouth communication leads to the equality of all decisions.

Keywords: Consensus; common knowledge; word of mouth communication. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02, Revised 2006-01
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2005/V05031.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Consensus, communication and knowledge: An extension with Bayesian agents (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Consensus, communication and knowledge: an extension with bayesian agents (2005) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v05031

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