Consensus, Communication and Knowledge: an Extension with Bayesian Agents
Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)
We extend the result of Parikh and Krasucki  to the case where the set of available decisions is arbitrary. We show that if agents are bayesian and choose the action that maximizes their expected utility, then word of mouth communication leads to the equality of all decisions.
Keywords: Consensus; common knowledge; word of mouth communication. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2005-02, Revised 2006-01
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Journal Article: Consensus, communication and knowledge: An extension with Bayesian agents (2006)
Working Paper: Consensus, communication and knowledge: an extension with bayesian agents (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v05031
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