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Multiplayer belief revision

Antoine Billot, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud and Bernard Walliser

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: One main topic of the epistemic program of game theory deals with the value of information. To study this question in a broad context, one needs to adapt some of the tools used in multiplayer epistemic logic. A hierarchical belief structure is introduced both in a syntactical and semantical framework. In the same framework, a generalized notion of message is characterized by its content and its status. For a given message, a multiplayer belief revision rule that transforms any initial belief structure into a final belief one is designed. A representation theorem relates syntactical axioms to the belief revision rule.

Keywords: epistemic logic; Belief revision; message; epistemic logic.; Révision des croyances; logique épistémique. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00344461v1
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Published in 2008

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Working Paper: Multiplayer belief revision (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Multiplayer belief revision (2008) Downloads
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