Multiplayer belief revision

Antoine Billot, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud () and Bernard Walliser
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Jean-Christophe Vergnaud: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: One main topic of the epistemic program of game theory deals with the value of information. To study this question in a broad context, one needs to adapt some of the tools used in multiplayer epistemic logic. A hierarchical belief structure is introduced both in a syntactical and semantical framework. In the same framework, a generalized notion of message is characterized by its content and its status. For a given message, a multiplayer belief revision rule that transforms any initial belief structure into a final belief one is designed. A representation theorem relates syntactical axioms to the belief revision rule

Keywords: Belief revision; message; epistemic logic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2008/V08067.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Multiplayer belief revision (2008)
Working Paper: Multiplayer belief revision (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:v08067

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