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The core of games on k-regular set systems

Lijue Xie () and Michel Grabisch
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Lijue Xie: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In the classical setting of cooperative game theory, it is always assumed that all coalitions are feasible. However in many real situations, there are restrictions on the set of coalitions, for example duo to communication, order or hierarchy on the set of players, etc. There are already many works dealing with games on restricted set of coalitions, defining many different structures for the set of feasible coalitions, called set systems. We propose in this paper to consider k-regular set systems, that is, set systems having all maximal chains of the same length k. This is somehow related to communication graphs. We study in this perspective the core of games defined on k-regular set systems. We show that the core may be unbounded and without vertices in some situations.

Keywords: Cooperative game; feasible coalition; core; Jeu coopératif; coalition réalisable; coeur (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00423922v2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in 2009

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Working Paper: The core of games on k-regular set systems (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: The core of games on k-regular set systems (2009) Downloads
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