The core of games on k-regular set systems

Lijue Xie (xielijue@yahoo.fr) and Michel Grabisch
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Lijue Xie: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In the classical setting of cooperative game theory, it is always assumed that all coalitions are feasible. However in many real situations, there are restrictions on the set of coalitions, for example duo to communication, order or hierarchy on the set of players, etc. There are already many works dealing with games on restricted set of coalitions, defining many different structures for the set of feasible coalitions, called set systems. We propose in this paper to consider k-regular set systems, that is, set systems having all maximal chains of the same length k. This is somehow related to communication graphs. We study in this perspective the core of games defined on k-regular set systems. We show that the core may be unbounded and without vertices in some situations

Keywords: Cooperative game; feasible coalition; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2009-09, Revised 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2009/09055.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The core of games on k-regular set systems (2009)
Working Paper: The core of games on k-regular set systems (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:09055

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