A note on the stochastic stability of equilibrium in some exchange economies

Antoine Mandel and Nicola Botta ()
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Nicola Botta: PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Building upon recent work of Gintis, we study evolutionary dynamics in an economy with Leontieff preferences and corner endowments for which the equilibrium is completely indeterminate. We exhibit a class of dynamics which selects, via stochastic stability, the equilibrium minimizing the quantities traded.

Keywords: bargaining games; equilibrium selection; stochastic stability.; stochastic stability; Exchange economies; Economies d'échange; jeux de marchandage; sélection d'équilibres; stabilité stochastique. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00442864v1
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Published in 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: A note on the stochastic stability of equilibrium in some exchange economies (2009)
Working Paper: A note on the stochastic stability of equilibrium in some exchange economies (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00442864

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