A note on the stochastic stability of equilibrium in some exchange economies

Antoine Mandel and Nicola Botta (botta@pik-potsdam.de)
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Nicola Botta: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Building upon recent work of Gintis, we study evolutionary dynamics in an economy with Leontieff preferences and corner endowments for which the equilibrium is completely indeterminate. We exhibit a class of dynamics which selects, via stochastic stability, the equilibrium minimizing the quantities traded

Keywords: Exchange economies; bargaining games; equilibrium selection; stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C63 C78 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-12
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2009/09084.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A note on the stochastic stability of equilibrium in some exchange economies (2009)
Working Paper: A note on the stochastic stability of equilibrium in some exchange economies (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:09084

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