Coordination with Communication under Oath

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Stephane Luchini (), Jason Shogren and Adam Zylbersztejn ()
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Stephane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Herein we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic sequential coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap-talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment-via-the-oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.

Keywords: Coordination game; Cheap talk communication; Oath (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00635801v2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2015)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2015)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00635801

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