Coordination with communication under oath

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Stéphane Luchini (), Jason Shogren and Adam Zylbersztejn ()
Additional contact information
Stéphane Luchini: GREQAM-CNRS
Adam Zylbersztejn: Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2

Experimental Economics, 2018, vol. 21, issue 3, No 8, 627-649

Abstract: Abstract We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50%; (2) senders’ messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers’ trust of messages increased.

Keywords: Coordination game; Cheap talk communication; Oath (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with communication under oath (2018)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2015)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2015)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2011)
Working Paper: Coordination with Communication under Oath (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x

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