Insider Trading with Different Market Structures

Wassim Daher, Fida Karam () and Leonard Mirman

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insiders under three different market structures : (i) Cournot competition among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii) monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market. We show how the equilibrium outcomes are affected by each of the market structure. Finally we perform a comparative statics analysis between the models.

Keywords: Insider trading; Cournot; Stackelberg; correlated signals; Kyle model; Initié; Stakelberg; signaux corrélés; modèle de Kyle. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-fmk and nep-ind
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00639657
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Published in 2011

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Related works:
Journal Article: Insider trading with different market structures (2012)
Working Paper: Insider Trading with Different Market Structures (2011)
Working Paper: Insider trading with different market structures (2011)
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