Insider trading with different market structures

Wassim Daher, Fida Karam (karam.f@gust.edu.kw) and Leonard Mirman

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insiders under three different market structures: (i) Cournot competition among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii) monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market. We show how the equilibrium outcomes are affected by each of the market structure. Finally we perform a comparative statics analysis between the models

Keywords: Insider trading; Cournot; Stackelberg; correlated signals; Kyle model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11056.pdf (application/pdf)
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00639657
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2012.01.008

Related works:
Journal Article: Insider trading with different market structures (2012)
Working Paper: Insider Trading with Different Market Structures (2011)
Working Paper: Insider Trading with Different Market Structures (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11056

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