On the Simultaneous Emergence of Money and the State

Gaël Giraud and Myrna Wooders

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We construct a infinite-horizon political game where the production of a public good is delegated to a politician. The politician is controlled by finitely many citizens who, on the other hand, trade commodities and pay taxes on a voluntary basis. We provide conditions in terms of heterogenous beliefs under one single commodity is used both as a universal means of exchange and a means to pay taxes. These provide an analytical framework for the understanding of money as originating both from the private and the public sector simultaneously.

Keywords: Money; strategic market game; political economy; heterogenous beliefs; Monnaie; jeu stratégique de marchés; économie politique; croyances hétérogènes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00786075v1
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Published in 2012

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Simultaneous Emergence of Money and the State (2012)
Working Paper: On the Simultaneous Emergence of Money and the State (2012)
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