On the Simultaneous Emergence of Money and the State

Gaël Giraud and Myrna Wooders

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We construct a infinite-horizon political game where the production of a public good is delegated to a politician. The politician is controlled by finitely many citizens who, on the other hand, trade commodities and pay taxes on a voluntary basis. We provide conditions in terms of heterogenous beliefs under one single commodity is used both as a universal means of exchange and a means to pay taxes. These provide an analytical framework for the understanding of money as originating both from the private and the public sector simultaneously

Keywords: Money; strategic market game; political economy; heterogenous beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 E40 E50 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2012-12
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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12094.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On the Simultaneous Emergence of Money and the State (2012)
Working Paper: On the Simultaneous Emergence of Money and the State (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12094

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