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Game Theoretic Interaction and Decision: A Quantum Analysis

Ulrich Faigle () and Michel Grabisch

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, depending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-adjoint matrices and hence a spectral representation. As a result, cooperation systems, decision systems and quantum systems all become visible as manifestations of special interaction systems. The treatment of the theory is purely mathematical and does not require any special knowledge of physics. It is shown how standard notions in cooperative game theory arise naturally in this context. In particular, Fourier transformation of cooperative games becomes meaningful. Moreover, quantum games fall into framework. Finally, a theory of Markov evolution of interaction states is presented that generalizes classical homogeneous Markov chains to the present context.

Keywords: cooperative game; decision system; Fourier transform; interaction system; measurement; quantum game; jeu coopératif; système de décision; évolution; transformée de Fourier; système d'interaction; mesurage; jeux quantique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2017-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01659148
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Published in 2017

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Journal Article: Game Theoretic Interaction and Decision: A Quantum Analysis (2017) Downloads
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