Game Theoretic Interaction and Decision: A Quantum Analysis
Ulrich Faigle () and
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, depending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-adjoint matrices and hence a spectral representation. As a result, cooperation systems, decision systems and quantum systems all become visible as manifestations of special interaction systems. The treatment of the theory is purely mathematical and does not require any special knowledge of physics. It is shown how standard notions in cooperative game theory arise naturally in this context. In particular, Fourier transformation of cooperative games becomes meaningful. Moreover, quantum games fall into framework. Finally, a theory of Markov evolution of interaction states is presented that generalizes classical homogeneous Markov chains to the present context
Keywords: cooperative game; decision system; evolution; Fourier transform; interaction system; measurement; quantum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hme and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Game Theoretic Interaction and Decision: A Quantum Analysis (2017)
Working Paper: Game Theoretic Interaction and Decision: A Quantum Analysis (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:17046
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