From Normative Rationality to Cognitive Consistency
Louis Lévy-Garboua and
Serge Blondel
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Abstract:
Cognitive dissonance or cognitive consistency theory, as we understand it, does not presume irrational behavior although it is inconsistent with normative rationality. Previous discussions have overlooked that cognitive dissonance implied dynamic uncertainty. Once this dimension of choice is restored, it becomes obvious why normative rationality does not properly describe fully rational behavior. Aiming at cognitive consistency is then the optimal way to behave.
Keywords: Cognitive dissonance; dynamic uncertainty; rationality; dissonance cognitive; incertitude dynamique; rationalité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03774097
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Published in 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: From Normative Rationality to Cognitive Consistency (2000)
Working Paper: From Normative Rationality to Cognitive Consistency (2000) 
Working Paper: From Normative Rationality to Cognitive Consistency (2000) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-03774097
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