From Normative Rationality to Cognitive Consistency

Louis Lévy-Garboua and Serge Blondel

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: Cognitive dissonance or cognitive consistency theory, as we understand it, does not presume irrational behavior although it is inconsistent with normative rationality. Previous discussions have overlooked that cognitive dissonance implied dynamic uncertainty. Once this dimension of choice is restored, it becomes obvious why normative rationality does not properly describe fully rational behavior. Aiming at cognitive consistency is then the optimal way to behave

Keywords: Cognitive dissonance; Dynamic uncertainty; Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2000-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: From Normative Rationality to Cognitive Consistency (2000)
Working Paper: From Normative Rationality to Cognitive Consistency (2000)
Working Paper: From Normative Rationality to Cognitive Consistency (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla00067

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