I Solemnly Swear I'm Up To Good: A Megastudy Investigating the Effectiveness of Honesty Oaths on Curbing Dishonesty

Janis Zickfeld, Karolina Scigala, Christian Elbaek, John Michael, Mathilde Tønning Tønnesen, Gabriel Levy, Shahar Ayal, Isabel Thielmann, Laila Nockur, Eyal Peer, Valerio Capraro, Rachel Barkan, Simen Bø, Štěpán Bahník, Daniele Nosenzo, Ralph Hertwig, Nina Mazar, Alexa Weiss, Ann-Kathrin Koessler, Ronit Montal-Rosenberg, Sebastian Hafenbrädl, Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen, Patricia Kanngiesser, Simon Schindler, Philipp Gerlach, Nils Köbis, Nicolas Jacquemet (), Marek Albert Vranka, Dan Ariely, Jareef Martuza, Yuval Feldman, Michal Bialek, Jan Kristian Woike, Zoe Rahwan, Alicia Seidl, Eileen Chou, Agne Kajackaite, Simeon Schudy, Ulrich Glogowsky, Anna Czarna, Stefan Pfattheicher and Panagiotis Mitkidis
Additional contact information
Janis Zickfeld: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Karolina Scigala: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Christian Elbaek: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
John Michael: UNIMI - Università degli Studi di Milano = University of Milan
Mathilde Tønning Tønnesen: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Gabriel Levy: NTNU University Museum [Trondheim] - NTNU - Norwegian University of Science and Technology [Trondheim] - NTNU - Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Shahar Ayal: RUNI - Reichman University [Herzliya]
Isabel Thielmann: Max-Planck-Institut
Laila Nockur: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Eyal Peer: HUJ - The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Valerio Capraro: UNIMIB - Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca = University of Milano-Bicocca
Rachel Barkan: BGU - Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Simen Bø: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration - Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Štěpán Bahník: VSE - Prague University of Economics and Business
Ralph Hertwig: Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Nina Mazar: BU - Boston University [Boston]
Alexa Weiss: Universität Bielefeld = Bielefeld University
Ann-Kathrin Koessler: Leibniz Universität Hannover=Leibniz University Hannover
Ronit Montal-Rosenberg: HUJ - The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Sebastian Hafenbrädl: IESE Business School - IESE Business School
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Patricia Kanngiesser: Plymouth University
Simon Schindler: Federal University of Applied Administrative Services, Berlin
Philipp Gerlach: Fresenius University, Hamburg
Nils Köbis: Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Marek Albert Vranka: Charles University, Faculty of Education [Prague]
Dan Ariely: Duke University [Durham]
Jareef Martuza: Department of Strategy and Management, Norwegian School of Economics
Yuval Feldman: Bar-Ilan University [Israël]
Michal Bialek: UWr - University of Wrocław [Poland]
Jan Kristian Woike: Plymouth University
Zoe Rahwan: Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Alicia Seidl: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law = Max Planck institut zur erforschung von kriminalität sicherheit und recht
Eileen Chou: University of Virginia
Anna Czarna: UJ - Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie = Jagiellonian University = Université Jagellon de Cracovie
Stefan Pfattheicher: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Panagiotis Mitkidis: Aarhus University [Aarhus]

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Dishonest behaviors such as tax evasion impose significant societal costs. Ex-ante honesty oaths—commitments to honesty before action—have been proposed as useful interventions to counteract dishonest behavior, but the heterogeneity in findings across operationalizations calls their effectiveness into question. We tested 21 honesty oaths (including a baseline oath)—proposed, evaluated, and selected by 44 expert researchers—and a no-oath condition in a megastudy in which 21,506 UK and US participants played an incentivized tax evasion game. Of the 21 interventions, 10 significantly improved tax compliance by 4.5 to 8.5 percentage points, with the most successful nearly halving tax evasion. Limited evidence for moderators was found. Experts and laypeople failed to predict the most effective interventions, but experts' predictions were more accurate. In conclusion, honesty oaths can be effective in curbing dishonesty but their effectiveness varies depending on content. These findings can help design impactful interventions to curb dishonesty.

Keywords: honesty oath; dishonesty; tax compliance; nudging; unethical behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-iue and nep-nud
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04555561v1
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Working Paper: I Solemnly Swear I'm Up To Good: A Megastudy Investigating the Effectiveness of Honesty Oaths on Curbing Dishonesty (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-04555561

DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/hctxe

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