Effectiveness of ex ante honesty oaths in reducing dishonesty depends on content

Janis Zickfeld, Karolina Ścigała, Christian Elbæk, John Michael, Mathilde Tønnesen, Gabriel Levy, Shahar Ayal, Isabel Thielmann, Laila Nockur, Eyal Peer, Valerio Capraro, Rachel Barkan, Simen Bø, Štěpán Bahník, Daniele Nosenzo, Ralph Hertwig, Nina Mazar, Alexa Weiss, Ann-Kathrin Koessler, Ronit Montal-Rosenberg, Sebastian Hafenbrädl, Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen, Patricia Kanngiesser, Simon Schindler, Philipp Gerlach, Nils Köbis, Nicolas Jacquemet (), Marek Vranka, Dan Ariely, Jareef Bin Martuza, Yuval Feldman, Michał Białek, Jan Woike, Zoe Rahwan, Alicia Seidl, Eileen Chou, Agne Kajackaite, Simeon Schudy, Ulrich Glogowsky, Anna Czarna, Stefan Pfattheicher and Panagiotis Mitkidis
Additional contact information
Janis Zickfeld: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Karolina Ścigała: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Christian Elbæk: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
John Michael: UNIMI - Università degli Studi di Milano = University of Milan
Mathilde Tønnesen: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Shahar Ayal: RUNI - Reichman University [Herzliya]
Laila Nockur: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Eyal Peer: HUJ - The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Valerio Capraro: UNIMIB - Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca = University of Milano-Bicocca
Rachel Barkan: BGU - Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Simen Bø: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration - Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Daniele Nosenzo: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Nina Mazar: BU - Boston University [Boston]
Ann-Kathrin Koessler: Leibniz Universität Hannover=Leibniz University Hannover
Ronit Montal-Rosenberg: HUJ - The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen: Aarhus University [Aarhus]
Patricia Kanngiesser: Plymouth University
Nils Köbis: Max Planck Institute for Human Development - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Marek Vranka: UK - Univerzita Karlova [Praha, Česká republika] = Charles University [Prague, Czech Republic]
Dan Ariely: Duke University [Durham]

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Dishonest behaviours such as tax evasion impose significant societal costs. Ex ante honesty oaths—commitments to honesty before action—have been proposed as interventions to counteract dishonest behaviour, but the heterogeneity in findings across operationalizations calls their effectiveness into question. We tested 21 honesty oaths (including a baseline oath)—proposed, evaluated and selected by 44 expert researchers—and a no-oath condition in a megastudy involving 21,506 UK and US participants from Prolific.com who played an incentivized tax evasion game online. Of the 21 interventions, 10 significantly improved tax compliance by 4.5 to 8.5 percentage points, with the most successful nearly halving tax evasion. Limited evidence for moderators was found. Experts and laypeople failed to predict the most effective interventions, though experts' predictions were more accurate. In conclusion, honesty oaths were effective in curbing dishonesty, but their effectiveness varied depending on content. These findings can help design impactful interventions to curb dishonesty.

Date: 2024-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04768623v1
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Published in Nature Human Behaviour, 2024, ⟨10.1038/s41562-024-02009-0⟩

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Journal Article: Effectiveness of ex ante honesty oaths in reducing dishonesty depends on content (2025)
Working Paper: Effectiveness of ex ante honesty oaths in reducing dishonesty depends on content (2024)
Working Paper: Effectiveness of ex ante honesty oaths in reducing dishonesty depends on content (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-04768623

DOI: 10.1038/s41562-024-02009-0

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