Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public GoodsThe role of Negotiation Mandates
Jean-Charles Hourcade and
Franck Lecocq ()
CIRED Working Papers from HAL
We examine the international distribution of expenditures for the provision ofa global, long-term and uncertain public goods from the point of view of abenevolent planner. Even assuming a "no-redistribution" constraint, first periodexpenditures are in general progressive with income, and independent both fromtotal level of action, and from future distribution of damages. However, instatus-quo mandates-where current negotiating powers shape both present andfuture allocation-future distributions of efforts are very unequal, andagreement, if any, is at high risk of instability. An adaptative mandate provesnecessary to provide an acceptable solution.
Keywords: Equitable Provision; Negotiation Mandates; Long-Term Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public GoodsThe role of Negotiation Mandates (2003)
Working Paper: Equitable provision of long-term public goods: the role of negotiation mandates (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:ciredw:halshs-00000968
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