Equitable provision of long-term public goods: the role of negotiation mandates
Franck Lecocq () and
Jean-Charles Hourcade
No 3180, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank
Abstract:
In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties'willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.
Keywords: Montreal Protocol; Economic Theory&Research; Information Technology; Environmental Economics&Policies; General Technology; Montreal Protocol; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Energy and Environment; Transport and Environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public GoodsThe role of Negotiation Mandates (2003) 
Working Paper: Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public GoodsThe role of Negotiation Mandates (2003) 
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