Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game

Tarik Tazdaït, Moussa Larbani and Rabia Nessah ()

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Abstract: In this paper, we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium which is also a Pareto efficient (SBPE) and the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). We prove that any SBPE is also a SNE, we prove also existence theorem of SBPE based on the KyFan inequality. Finally, we also provide a method for computing SPBE.

Keywords: Strong Berge equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; strong Nash equilibrium; Ky Fan inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00271464v1
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Working Paper: Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game (2007)
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