Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game
Moussa Larbani and
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Rabia Nessah: UMR CNRS 8179 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies
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In this paper, we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium which is also a Pareto efficient (SBPE) and the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). We prove that any SBPE is also a SNE, we prove also existence theorem of SBPE based on the KyFan inequality. Finally, we also provide a method for computing SPBE.
Keywords: Strong Berge equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; strong Nash equilibrium; Ky Fan inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00271464
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