Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004
Pierre André () and
Sandrine Mesplé-Somps ()
PSE - G-MOND WORKING PAPERS from HAL
The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this _nding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.
Keywords: Public goods; Elections; Politics; Ghana (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996-2004 (2011)
Working Paper: Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy: The case of Ghana, 1996-2004 (2011)
Working Paper: Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004 (2010)
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