Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills

Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet

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Abstract: We develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on information about agents' indifference curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and different preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in skills, and equal access to resources for all preferences.

Keywords: fairness; social orderings; income inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 24, pp.93-128

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Journal Article: Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills (2005)
Working Paper: Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00246989

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