Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills

Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet

Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, vol. 24, issue 1, 93-127

Abstract: We develop an approach which escapes Arrow’s impossibility by relying on information about agents’ indifference curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and different preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in skills, and equal access to resources for all preferences. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills (2005)
Working Paper: Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills (2005)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0294-y

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