Inquisitorial and Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting

Bruno Deffains () and Dominique Demougin
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Bruno Deffains: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Dominique Demougin: EBS Paris - European Business School Paris

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Abstract: We provide a comparison of the adversarial and inquisitorial trial procedures. We find that social costs associated with a given level of justice are always smaller under the adversarial rule. Nevertheless, the inquisitorial rule may be better because it allows for state control of all the investigative expenditures. In contrast, under the adversarial procedure, investigative expenditures will be mainly constrained by individual wealth, leading to inefficient justice levels, higher social cost, and potentially large inequalities.

Date: 2005
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Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2005, 164 (1), pp.31-43. ⟨10.1628/jite-2008-0018⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279243

DOI: 10.1628/jite-2008-0018

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