Details about Dominique Demougin

Access statistics for papers by Dominique Demougin.

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Short-id: pde25

Working Papers

2012

1. Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World
   Working Papers, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics

2009

2. Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study
   CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (2)
3. Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits
   CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (5)
   Also in Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics (2008) View citations (1)
   Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL), Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) (2009) View citations (1)

2007

4. Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives
   CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (3)
   Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2006) View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Rules of proof, courts, and incentives, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2008) View citations (46) (2008)

2006

5. Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
   Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL), Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) View citations (25)
   See also Journal Article Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power, German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik (2006) View citations (23) (2006)
6. Output and wages with inequality averse agents
   Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL), Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) View citations (44)
   Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2004) View citations (1)
   CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2004) View citations (11)
   See also Journal Article Output and wages with inequality averse agents, Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association (2006) View citations (47) (2006)

2004

7. Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof
   CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO View citations (4)
   Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2004) View citations (1)
8. Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity
   Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE)
   Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2003) View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY, International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association (2006) View citations (15) (2006)
9. The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employees
   Discussion Papers, Series I, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics View citations (4)

2003

10. Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (17)
    Also in CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2003) View citations (6)
11. Inequity Aversion in Tournament
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO View citations (17)
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2003) View citations (46)

2002

12. Preponderance of Evidence
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal View citations (11)
    Also in CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2002) View citations (11)
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2002) View citations (8)
    See also Journal Article Preponderance of evidence, European Economic Review, Elsevier (2006) View citations (38) (2006)

2000

13. Limiting Court Behavior: A Case for High Minimum Sentences and Low Maximum Ones
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal
    See also Journal Article Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2003) View citations (1) (2003)
14. Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal

1999

15. Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal View citations (1)
16. Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA
    ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
    See also Journal Article Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2003) View citations (6) (2003)
17. Society Versus Jury: A Case for Limiting Behavior
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques View citations (1)

1998

18. A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article A further justification for the negligence rule, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (1999) View citations (16) (1999)
19. Public Safety, Altruism and Redistribution
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal View citations (1)
20. Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition, Economic Theory, Springer (2001) View citations (6) (2001)

1997

21. Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal View citations (1)

1996

22. Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (1998) View citations (40) (1998)

1995

23. Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques View citations (1)

1994

24. Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm
    Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics View citations (7)
    Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (1993)
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (1992) View citations (1)
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (1992) View citations (2)
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques (1992) View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (1994) View citations (11) (1994)

1992

25. Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal
    See also Journal Article Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (1994) View citations (53) (1994)
26. Managerial Husbandry and the Dynamics of Ongoing Firms
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal View citations (2)

1991

27. Contractual Design with Correlated Information Under Limited Liability
    Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University View citations (48)
    See also Journal Article Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability, RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1991) View citations (45) (1991)

1989

28. A SIGNALLING MODEL OF NOMINAL PRICE INERTIA
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv
    Also in Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research (1989)

Undated

29. Should We Have or Should We Have Not, and Who Should Have Paid?
    Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics

Journal Articles

2020

1. Causation and Incentives with Updating Courts
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2020, 176, (1), 147-151
2. Interpreting contracts: the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts
   European Journal of Law and Economics, 2020, 50, (2), 241-265

2019

3. The Nexus between Contract Duration and the Use of Formal and Informal Incentive Pay
   LABOUR, 2019, 33, (3), 351-370 View citations (1)

2017

4. Choosing ADR or litigation
   International Review of Law and Economics, 2017, 49, (C), 33-40 View citations (1)
5. Toward a Theory of Motion Practice and Settlement
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2017, 173, (1), 163-167

2016

6. Privatizing profits and socializing losses with smoothly operating capital markets
   European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, 44, (C), 179-194

2014

7. Third-Party Financing of Litigation: Legal Approaches and a Formal Model
   CESifo Economic Studies, 2014, 60, (3), 525-553 View citations (5)

2012

8. Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device
   Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2012, 21, (1), 31-52 View citations (3)

2011

9. Class Actions, Compliance and Moral Cost
   Review of Law & Economics, 2011, 7, (2), 481-500 View citations (3)
10. Introduction: CESifo Conference in Law and Economics - Munich, May 2010
    Review of Law & Economics, 2011, 7, (2), 353-354
11. Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard
    European Economic Review, 2011, 55, (7), 964-979 View citations (12)

2010

12. Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation
    Journal of Macroeconomics, 2010, 32, (1), 443-456 View citations (71)
13. Technology adoption under hidden information
    Journal of Economics, 2010, 100, (1), 1-18

2008

14. Customary versus technological advancement tests
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2008, 28, (2), 106-112 View citations (7)
15. Do factor shares reflect technology?
    Journal of Macroeconomics, 2008, 30, (3), 1329-1334 View citations (4)
16. Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2008, 24, (3), 615-627 View citations (1)
17. Rules of proof, courts, and incentives
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, 39, (1), 20-40 View citations (46)
    See also Working Paper Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives, CESifo Working Paper Series (2007) View citations (3) (2007)
18. The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 31-43 View citations (16)

2007

19. Entrepreneurship and the Division of Ownership in New Ventures
    Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007, 16, (1), 111-128 View citations (2)
20. Économie des procédures judiciaires
    Revue économique, 2007, 58, (6), 1265-1290

2006

21. INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
    International Economic Review, 2006, 47, (3), 1033-1055 View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity, Papers (2004) (2004)
22. Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
    German Economic Review, 2006, 7, (4), 463-470 View citations (23)
    See also Working Paper Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power, Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) (2006) View citations (25) (2006)
23. Output and wages with inequality averse agents
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2006, 39, (2), 399-413 View citations (47)
    Also in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2006, 39, (2), 399-413 (2006) View citations (38)
    See also Working Paper Output and wages with inequality averse agents, Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) (2006) View citations (44) (2006)
24. Preponderance of evidence
    European Economic Review, 2006, 50, (4), 963-976 View citations (38)
    See also Working Paper Preponderance of Evidence, Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers (2002) View citations (11) (2002)

2005

25. Deterrence versus Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2005, 161, (2), 193-206 View citations (32)

2004

26. Eliteuniversitäten: Stärkung des Forschungs- und Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland?
    ifo Schnelldienst, 2004, 57, (16), 03-11
27. Ärzte unterschiedlicher Sorgfaltswaltung, fehlerhafte Gerichte und der Fahrlässigkeitsstandard: Korreferat zum Beitrag von Anja Olbrich: "Der Einfluss von Haftungsunsicherheit auf den Sorgfaltsstandard"
    Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, 2004, 73, (4), 575-578

2003

28. Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2003, 23, (2), 217-225 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA, ZEW Discussion Papers (1999) (1999)
29. Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2003, 23, (3), 309-321 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper Limiting Court Behavior: A Case for High Minimum Sentences and Low Maximum Ones, Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers (2000) (2000)

2001

30. Monitoring versus incentives
    European Economic Review, 2001, 45, (9), 1741-1764 View citations (82)

2000

31. Excess burden of criminality and redistribution
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2000, 20, (3), 329-351 View citations (7)
32. Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition
    Economic Theory, 2001, 17, (2), 489-496 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition, Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers (1998) View citations (5) (1998)

1999

33. A further justification for the negligence rule
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1999, 19, (1), 33-45 View citations (16)
    See also Working Paper A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule, Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM (1998) View citations (4) (1998)

1998

34. Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, 154, (4), 622- View citations (40)
    See also Working Paper Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem, Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM (1996) View citations (5) (1996)

1996

35. Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies
    European Economic Review, 1996, 40, (7), 1483-1499 View citations (1)

1994

36. Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies
    American Economic Review, 1994, 84, (5), 1261-77 View citations (53)
    See also Working Paper Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies, Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers (1992) (1992)
37. Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm
    Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 55, (2), 203-231 View citations (11)
    See also Working Paper Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm, Munich Reprints in Economics (1994) View citations (7) (1994)

1993

38. Property Rights and Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information/Eigentumsrechte und Regulierung der Umweltqualität bei asymmetrischer Information
    Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 1993, 211, (5-6), 385-402

1991

39. Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (4), 477-489 View citations (45)
    See also Working Paper Contractual Design with Correlated Information Under Limited Liability, Working Paper (1991) View citations (48) (1991)
40. Efficient Budget Balancing Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring
    Economic Theory, 1991, 1, (4), 373-83 View citations (1)

1989

41. A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1989, 20, (2), 256-267 View citations (13)

Editor

1. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
   Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen