Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious
Dominique Demougin () and
Claude Fluet ()
Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE
We consider the effects on reward systems of workers' concern with relative pay by comparing the wage costs of providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, either scheme may be the least cost one depending on the workers' outside opportunities and on the precision of available performance measures. The result follows from the trade-off between the dissatisfaction associated with the prospect of unequal pay and the incentives it generates when workers are envious.
Keywords: Bonus; efficiency wage; envy; fairness; incentives; moral hazard; performance measure; pay equality; wage compression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 J4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0318
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