Économie des procédures judiciaires

Bruno Deffains (), Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet
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Bruno Deffains: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Dominique Demougin: EBS Paris - European Business School Paris

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Abstract: We debate the contribution of the economic analysis of legal procedures, with a special regard for the debate between inquisitorial and accusatory systems and the judge's role in the course of the procedure. The article proposes a presentation of the literature and develops specific models concerning penal as well as civil procedures. In the two cases, the demonstration is brought that the judge's role is susceptible to be determinant in the research of the efficiency of the judicial system. The paper takes the opposite of numerous previous analyses that generally concludes to the superiority –in terms of economic efficiency– of the common law system characterized by a more "passive" role of the judge.

Date: 2007
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Published in Revue Economique, 2007, 58 (6), pp.1265-1290. ⟨10.3917/reco.586.1265⟩

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Journal Article: Économie des procédures judiciaires (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279406

DOI: 10.3917/reco.586.1265

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