Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof

Dominique Demougin () and Claude Fluet

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We argue that the common law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher but somewhat imprecise standard may be interpreted as reflecting a tradeoff between providing incentives and avoiding judicial error per se. In our model, the optimal judicial system has rules resembling those in the common law when providing incentives is paramount. When greater weight is given to avoiding error, the optimal system has civilian features.

Keywords: Standard of proof; burden of proof; common law; civil law; evidentiary rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0418

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