Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem
Dominique Demougin () and
Claude Fluet ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, vol. 154, issue 4, 622-
This paper analyzes the efficient use of information in an agency relationship with moral hazard, when parties are risk-neutral. We show that, given an arbitrary information system, all relevant information from a mechanism-design point of view can be summarized by a binary statistic. We then show that this allows a complete ordering of information systems for the risk-neutral agency problem. These results are obtained under a weak convexity condition which does not rely on an exogenous ordering on signal sets. The condition is shown to be more general than existing requirements for justifying the first-order approach.
JEL-codes: D2 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199812)154:4_622:mssitr_2.0.tx_2-t
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