Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

Marco Scarsini, Sergio Scarlatti and Jérôme Renault
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Sergio Scarlatti: Dipartimento SEFEMEQ - Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata [Roma, Italia] = University of Rome Tor Vergata [Rome, Italy] = Université de Rome Tor Vergata [Rome, Italie]

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Abstract: We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered by Renault et al. (2005), who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted version and a finitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous result by showing that the set of equilibrium payos Hausdor-converges to the feasible set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to infinity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria.

Keywords: Repeated games; imperfect monitoring; public equilibria; private equilibria; Pareto-efficiency; discount factor.; discount factor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 56 (1), pp.44-74. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.004⟩

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Journal Article: Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00365583

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.004

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