An empirical study of hybrid forms of governance structure: the case of the telecommunication equipment industry

Bernard Garrette () and Bertrand Quelin
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Bernard Garrette: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This article examines hybrid forms of governance structures as defined in transaction cost theory. It demonstrates that these hybrid forms can be split into a small number of discrete categories instead of being distributed evenly on a continuum between market and hierarchy. The analysis is based on a sample of strategic partnerships set up by telecommunication equipment manufacturers, either among themselves or with firms of related industries. The taxonomy of strategic partnerships presented in this paper underlines the importance of the organization of tasks and the symmetry of the contributions of the partner firms as discriminating factors of hybrid forms.

Keywords: Telecommunication equipment industry; Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Research Policy, 1994, Vol. 23, n° 4, pp. 395-412. ⟨10.1016/0048-7333(94)90004-3⟩

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Journal Article: An empirical study of hybrid forms of governance structure: the case of the telecommunication equipment industry (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00459471

DOI: 10.1016/0048-7333(94)90004-3

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