Protocols with no acknowledgment

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()

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Abstract: We study a simple protocol for communication networks, in which users get no receipt acknowledgment of their requests. As a result, users hold partial and differential information over the state of the protocol. We characterize optimal behavior by viewing the protocol as a stochastic game with partial observation. We also study two classes of protocols that generalize this protocol.

Keywords: games/group decisions; stochastic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Operations Research, 2009, Vol.57,nº4, pp.905-915. ⟨10.1287/opre.1080.0644⟩

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Journal Article: Protocols with No Acknowledgment (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00491697

DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0644

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