Protocols with No Acknowledgment

Dinah Rosenberg (), Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()
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Dinah Rosenberg: Laboratoire d'Analyse Géométrie et Applications, Institut Galilée, Université Paris Nord, 93430 Villetaneuse, France, and Laboratoire d'Econométrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 75005 Paris, France
Nicolas Vieille: Département Finance et Economie, HEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France

Operations Research, 2009, vol. 57, issue 4, 905-915

Abstract: We study a simple protocol for communication networks, in which users get no receipt acknowledgment of their requests. As a result, users hold partial and differential information over the state of the protocol. We characterize optimal behavior by viewing the protocol as a stochastic game with partial observation. We also study two classes of protocols that generalize this protocol.

Keywords: games/group decisions; stochastic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0644 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Protocols with no acknowledgment (2009)
Working Paper: Protocols with no acknowledgment (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:oropre:v:57:y:2009:i:4:p:905-915

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