A strong paradox of multiple elections

Marco Scarsini

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Abstract: We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.

Keywords: Paradox; multiple elections; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, Vol. 15, N°2, pp. 237-238. ⟨10.1007/s003550050102⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00541791

DOI: 10.1007/s003550050102

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