A strong paradox of multiple elections

Marco Scarsini

Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, vol. 15, issue 2, 237-238

Abstract: We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.

Date: 1998-02-27
Note: Received: 8 April 1997/Accepted: 18 April 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/8015002/80150237.pdf (application/pdf)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/0035 ... 15002/80150237.ps.gz (application/postscript)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: A strong paradox of multiple elections (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:237-238

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().