Desk rejection in an academic publication market model with matching frictions

Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot and Kim Huynh (kim.huynh@u-paris2.fr)

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Subject to a huge and growing number of journal titles in business and economics, scholars sometimes target the wrong journal. Editors resort more and more to paper pre-screening, and desk reject those that do not fit well to the editorial line. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications that brings into the picture these matching frictions. The key modelling device is a paperjournal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. Our main endogenous variables are the submission fee and the tension in the publication market, itself directly related to the number of journal titles.

Keywords: Academic Journals; Desk Rejection; Editors; Imperfect Information; Matching; Appariement; Editeurs; Information imparfaite; Revues académiques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-00554732
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in 2009

Downloads: (external link)
https://essec.hal.science/hal-00554732/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Desk rejection in an academic publication market model with matching frictions (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00554732

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD (hal@ccsd.cnrs.fr).