A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market

Radu Vranceanu, Damien Besancenot and Kim Huyn
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Kim Huyn: LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

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Abstract: This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals'editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is de ned as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies, given the matching technology and the prevailing surplus sharing rule. The model can be solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors.

Keywords: Academic journals; Desk-rejection; Publishing; Matching; Imperfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-sog
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-00592134
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in 2011

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2011)
Working Paper: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2011)
Working Paper: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2011)
Working Paper: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2010)
Working Paper: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2010)
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